A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation
of Cryptocurrencies
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay proposes a conceptual framework for the regulation of transactions involving cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies
offer tremendous opportunities for innovation and development
but are also uniquely suited to facilitate illicit behavior. The
regulatory framework suggested herein is intended to support
(or at least not impair) cryptocurrencies’ innovative potential. At
the same time, it aims to disrupt cryptocurrencies’ criminal utility. To achieve these purposes, this Essay proposes a regulatory
framework that imposes costs on the characteristics of cryptocurrencies that make them especially useful for criminal behavior (in particular, anonymity) but does not impose costs on
characteristics that are at the core of cryptocurrencies’ generative potential (in particular, the decentralization of valuetransfer processes). Using a basic utility model of criminal behavior as a benchmark,1 this Essay explains how regulatory
instruments can be so designed. One such regulatory instrument
is proposed as an example—an elective anonymity tax on cryptocurrency transactions in which at least one party is not anonymous.
There has been increasing interest in the regulation of cryptocurrencies, with many inquiries focusing on the regulation of
cryptocurrencies within discrete areas of law.2 This Essay
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1
See note 30 and accompanying text.
2
See generally, for example, Stephen T. Middlebrook and Sarah Jane Hughes,
Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions,
40 Wm Mitchell L Rev 813 (2014); Jerry Brito, Houman B. Shadab, and Andrea Castillo,
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contributes to the discussion by suggesting a generic framework
for the design of regulatory instruments that address cryptocurrencies. The suggested framework is both direct and indirect in
its approach. It directly addresses possible incentives to use
cryptocurrencies illicitly. Indirectly, the framework takes advantage of the unique structure of cryptocurrencies’ protocols by
making legitimate users passive agents of regulatory efforts.
Specifically, a derivative benefit of the suggested framework is
that the legitimate use of cryptocurrency would have the effect
of making cryptocurrencies systemically less suitable for illicit
use.
This Essay is structured as follows: Part I briefly discusses
the core innovation of cryptocurrencies—the public ledger—and
explains its positive potential as well as the challenges that it
presents to traditional regulatory models. Part II introduces the
proposed regulatory approach in the abstract, using a basic utility model of criminal behavior as a linchpin for discussion. Part
III describes an elective tax on anonymity to demonstrate how
the suggested framework might operate in the context of tax
evasion. Part IV discusses possible critiques of the suggested
approach. The Essay concludes with a call for further discussion
of this new regulatory area.
I. VIRTUES, VICES, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency3 that is best known as a peer-topeer electronic cash system, is touted as being as revolutionary
as the Internet.4 The potential of Bitcoin5 and other
of the IMF, 14 Chi J Intl L 377 (2013). For two recent exceptions to the field-tailored
approach that advocate a broader view of the problem, see Andy Yee, Internet Architecture and the Layers Principle: A Conceptual Framework for Regulating Bitcoin, 3 Internet Pol Rev 1, 6–7 (2014); Kevin V. Tu and Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual
Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 Wash L Rev (forthcoming 2015), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2485550 (visited Nov 16, 2014).
3
I use the term “cryptocurrency” to refer to any digital currency that relies on
peer-to-peer cryptography for the validation of value transfers.
4
See, for example, Bloomberg TV, Here’s How Bitcoin Is Like the Early ’90s Internet (Mar 28, 2014), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/video/here-s-how-bitcoin-is-likeearly-90-s-internet-dU0H7ADwTl6arrq122kHPg.html (visited Nov 16, 2014); Saumya
Vaishampayan, Bitcoin Is Like the Early Internet, Minus the VC Money, Market Extra
(MarketWatch Apr 28, 2014), online at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bitcoinventure-capital-money-hasnt-kept-up-with-buzz-2014-04-28 (visited Nov 16, 2014).
5
The term “Bitcoin” is commonly used to refer to the technology, as opposed to
“bitcoin,” which refers to the virtual currency that is based on the technology and represents one possible application of it. See Kate Cox, Bitcoin: What the Heck Is It, and How
Does
It
Work?,
Consumerist
(Mar
4,
2014),
online
at
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cryptocurrencies extends beyond their applications as units of
account or mediums of exchange. Rather, the unique technological innovation common to most cryptocurrencies is a public ledger that functions as a decentralized system for recording ownership and value transfers. While the technical operation of the
ledger is complex,6 the core idea is rather simple. When an owner of a cryptocurrency (which can be described as an electronic
token) transfers the cryptocurrency to a recipient, the transaction is verified in a process called “mining.” A crowd of “miners”
consults the ledger, verifies the owner’s claim of ownership, and
documents the transfer to the recipient, who from now on is
logged on the ledger as the owner of the cryptocurrency. The verification process is a competitive one. The miners do not simply
verify the transaction; they compete to solve a complex cryptographic problem. The first miner to succeed wins the competition, logs the transaction on the ledger, and is awarded a new
batch of cryptocurrencies. The new batch of cryptocurrencies is
automatically generated by the software and functions both as
an incentive to participate in the mining process7 and as a decentralized mechanism for the issuance of new cryptocurrencies.
Anyone can become a miner by downloading the necessary software. Cryptocurrency software is open-source and generally not
controlled by a central entity.8
To summarize, cryptocurrencies are essentially protocols
that allow for the validation of transactions without the need for
a trusted third party such as a bank, credit card company, escrow agent, or recording agency.9 As such, cryptocurrencies hold
great innovative potential. They have been described as a “generative” technology on which powerful applications can be
built.10 For example, cryptocurrencies may dramatically reduce
http://consumerist.com/2014/03/04/bitcoin-what-the-heck-is-it-and-how-does-it-work (visited Nov 16, 2014).
6
For a thorough explanation of the verification process, see Ritchie S. King, Sam
Williams, and David Yanofsky, By Reading This Article, You’re Mining Bitcoins, Quartz
(Dec 17, 2013), online at http://qz.com/154877/by-reading-this-page-you-are-miningbitcoins (visited Nov 16, 2014).
7
In the alternative, miners could charge a fee for verifying the transaction.
8
See King, Williams, and Yanofsky, By Reading This Article, You’re Mining
Bitcoins (cited in note 6).
9
Brito, Shadab, and Castillo, 16 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev at *5 (cited in note 2).
10 The term “generative” is used here in the sense suggested by Jonathan Zittrain,
who describes generativity as “a function of a technology’s capacity for leverage across a
range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of mastery, and accessibility.” Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harv L Rev 1975, 1981 (2006).
For a reference to Bitcoin as a “generative” technology, see, for example, Timothy B. Lee,
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transaction costs associated with value transfers,11 engender access to financial transactions within sectors of the population
that do not have access to traditional financial institutions,12
avoid the pitfalls of managed or commodity-based monetary systems,13 and allow for the creation of self-enforcing smart contracts that do not rely on financial institutions, lawyers, or accountants for their execution.14
However, cryptocurrencies are also uniquely suited to facilitate harmful behaviors for two reasons.15 First, the only truly
public feature of the ledger is the documentation of ownership
and transfers. The owners themselves are not identified by
name on the ledger, but rather by a set of letters and numbers
representing their public cryptocurrency address (which, together with the private key that proves ownership of that address,
constitute the owner’s cryptocurrency “wallet”).16 Anyone can
freely create as many wallets as he or she desires, at practically
zero cost, without providing any identifying information.17 This
relatively high level of anonymity makes it difficult for regulators to identify individuals who use the protocol for illicit value
transfers.

Here’s What Critics Miss about Bitcoin’s Long-Term Potential, The Switch (Wash Post
Dec
3,
2013),
online
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/12/03/heres-what-critics-miss-about-bitcoins-long-term-potential (visited
Nov 16, 2014).
11 See Jerry Brito and Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers 10 (Mercatus 2013).
12 See id at 14–15 (discussing how bitcoin can improve financial access as a means
to fight poverty).
13 See George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money *11 (University of Georgia
Working
Paper,
Apr
2013),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000118 (visited Nov 16, 2014).
14 Brito and Castillo, Bitcoin at 16 (cited in note 11); Vitalik Buterin, DAOs Are Not
Scary, Part 1: Self-Enforcing Contracts and Factum Law, Bitcoin Magazine (Feb 24,
2014), online at http://bitcoinmagazine.com/10468/daos-scary-part-1-self-enforcingcontracts-factum-law (visited Nov 16, 2014).
15 A recent report by the Europol, for example, suggests that cryptocurrencies “are
heavily abused by criminals.” Europol, The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(iOCTA)
*42
(2014),
online
at
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_iocta_web.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014).
16 See
Bitcoin, Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, online at
https://bitcoin.org/en/vocabulary#private-key (visited Nov 20, 2014).
17 See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 Mich L Rev
First Impressions 38, 42 (2013).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509857

MARIAN_ONLINE_FINAL (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/27/2015 9:55 AM

The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies

57

It should be noted, however, that most cryptocurrencies are
not completely anonymous, but rather are pseudonymous.18 For
example, if the identity of some wallet owners is known, it is
theoretically possible to use these known nodes in the system to
build a “transaction graph” that tracks each particular cryptocurrency. By doing so, one could expose the identity of owners of
unknown wallets with which the known wallets transacted.19
However, this technique requires complex analysis and concentrated effort that may be worthwhile only when a particular
wallet is suspected of engaging in illicit activity.
The second reason that cryptocurrencies are suited for criminal activity is that our financial-regulation system heavily relies on regulating intermediaries that are uniquely positioned to
disrupt misconduct. For example, we subject financial institutions to “know-your-costumer rules” in order to prevent money
laundering, use banks as tax-withholding agents to prevent tax
evasion,20 and regulate securities exchanges to protect investors.
Some commentators argue that the public ledger has the potential to “eliminate intermediaries without eliminating the underlying conduct.”21 If that is the case, then regulators would lose
the ability to use intermediaries as regulatory agents.22 In theory, this would necessitate the regulation of dispersed crowds—
meaning direct regulation of individuals who participate in financial markets. Such regulation is immensely costly—a problem exacerbated by the fact that the users, as explained above,
are relatively anonymous. The combination of anonymity and
the decentralization of financial dealings presents governments
with formidable regulatory challenges.

18 See Craig K. Elwell, M. Maureen Murphy, and Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin:
Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues *3 (Congressional Research Service July 15, 2014), online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014).
19 See generally Malte Möser, Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions: An Analysis of
Mixing Services (University of Münster Working Paper, 2013), online at
https://www.wi.uni-muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbc13/
mbc13-moeser-paper.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014). See also Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir,
Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph, in Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,
ed, Financial Cryptography and Data Security 6 (Springer 2013).
20 See Europol, iOCTA at *42 (cited in note 15); IRS, Withholding Agent, (Nov 14,
2014), online at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/WithholdingAgent (visited Nov 18, 2014).
21 Brito, Shadab, and Castillo, 16 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev at *71 (cited in note 2).
22 See Yee, 3 Internet Pol Rev at 4–5 (cited in note 2).
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Some skepticism about the elimination of intermediaries
from cryptocurrency markets is warranted, however.23 Intermediaries are market-created, not government-created, constructs.
Intermediaries do not just serve as agents for buyers and sellers
but in fact add value to financial markets.24 The cryptocurrency
market demands the creation of new financial intermediaries to
serve it. Such intermediaries include exchanges of cryptocurrencies to fiat currencies, cryptocurrency-wallet service providers,
and clearinghouses for cryptocurrency transactions.25 These new
intermediaries can be subjected to traditional models of intermediary regulation, and indeed they have been. For example,
the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network subjects
certain cryptocurrency service providers to regulations as money
transmitters,26 the IRS requires certain cryptocurrency clearing
organizations to provide information to the IRS and their service
recipients,27 and the New York State Department of Financial
Services recently proposed rules that would require registration
and licensing for certain cryptocurrency financial services providers.28 This Essay proceeds under the assumption that many
new intermediaries would be subjected to traditional regulatory
models. The main contribution of this Essay is in the context of
transactions in which traditional intermediaries may become
obsolete.

23 See David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized PublicLedger Currency Platforms *14–16 (University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for
Law and Economics Research Paper No 685, Apr 15, 2014), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424516 (visited Nov 19, 2014).
24 See generally Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial
Intermediaries Do?, 25 J Bank & Fin 271 (2001). For the role of intermediaries in the
context of online markets, see generally George M. Giaglis, Stefan Klein, and Robert M.
O’Keefe, The Role of Intermediaries in Electronic Marketplaces: Developing a Contingency Model, 12 Info Systems J 231 (2002).
25 See Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin, Beware of the Middleman: Empirical
Analysis of Bitcoin-Exchange Risk, in Sadeghi, ed, Financial Cryptography 25, 26 (cited
in note 19).
26 US Department of Treasury, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies *3 (FinCEN Mar 18, 2013),
online at http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf (visited Nov
19, 2014).
27 IRS, Notice 2014-21 *5–6 (Mar 25, 2014), online at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/n-14-21.pdf (visited Nov 19, 2014).
28 See New York Department of Financial Services, Proposed New York Codes,
Rules and Regulations: Virtual Currencies *6 (July 17, 2014), online at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014).
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II. CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND THE UTILITY OF CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR
A.

Basic Assumptions

This Essay argues that regulation should not prevent cryptocurrencies from achieving their positive potential. On the other hand, regulation should prevent cryptocurrencies from becoming a vehicle for criminal activity. Therefore, regulation of
cryptocurrencies should not treat any cryptocurrency as a
homogeneous instrument. Rather, the idea is to deconstruct
cryptocurrencies into their unique traits, dealing with their vices and virtues separately. For example, decentralization is a
positive trait that should not be disrupted. Anonymity should be
targeted only to the extent that it increases the likelihood that
individuals use cryptocurrencies to engage in criminal behavior.
Accordingly, this Essay proceeds under the following assumptions and qualifications: First, the current level of criminal
activity in the market is taken as a benchmark. Regulating
cryptocurrencies is not intended to reduce the current level of
criminal activity but rather to ensure that cryptocurrencies do
not increase criminal activity. Second, it is assumed that financial anonymity has an independent normative appeal even
though it may facilitate criminal behavior.29 The current status
of financial anonymity is taken as a benchmark—any regulatory
framework should not decrease the current level of financial anonymity. However, regulation is also not aimed at increasing the
level of anonymity. Finally, the regulatory framework assumes
that, if no new regulatory costs are imposed on the legitimate
use of cryptocurrencies, the market will allow the new technology to develop to the extent that it offers benefits (other than anonymity) that fiat currencies do not.
B.

Addressing the Utility of Cryptocurrencies in Criminal
Behavior

Under the classic utility model of criminal behavior suggested by Professor Gary S. Becker, a rational, profit-seeking
29 See Jim Harper, Removing Impediments to Bitcoin’s Success: A Risk Management Study *5 (Bitcoin Foundation Research Brief No 1, 2014), online at
https://bitcoinfoundation.org/static/2014/04/Bitcoin-Risk-Management-Study-Spring2014.pdf (visited Nov 19, 2014).
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individual will engage in criminal behavior if the utility of doing
so is greater than zero (that is, greater than not engaging in
criminal behavior).30 In calculating the expected utility, an individual considers the expected gain from illicit behavior, the
probability of being sanctioned, and the cost of any sanction that
may be imposed.31
As noted above, the current level of criminal activity in the
market is taken as a benchmark. This means that all individuals have already calculated their expected utility from criminal
behavior and are either engaged or not engaged in criminal activity. The regulatory framework advanced in this Essay strives
to maintain the current level of criminal behavior.
Assume now that cryptocurrencies are introduced. An individual who had previously calculated negative utility from engaging in criminal behavior using fiat currencies—and therefore
was not engaged in criminal activity—is now presented with the
option to use cryptocurrencies. Using cryptocurrencies to facilitate the previously contemplated illicit activity significantly reduces the probability of being sanctioned due to the anonymity
associated with cryptocurrencies. Thus, if an individual expects
to extract the same value from illicit behavior—meaning that
the only difference is the denomination of the illicit gain—the
utility function produces a greater expected outcome.32
Consequently, individuals who had previously calculated
negative utility from engaging in criminal behavior might now
calculate positive utility solely because the illicit activity is executed through the use of cryptocurrencies. Thus, in the absence
of a regulatory response, a simple utility model predicts that the
introduction of cryptocurrencies would increase the level of criminal activity, because more individuals would engage in it.

30 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol
Econ 169, 176 (1968).
31 Becker’s basic utility function is expressed as follows:

E[U] = pU(Y – f ) + (1 – p)U(Y)
Where E[U] is the expected utility from engaging in criminal behavior, p is the probability of facing criminal sanction, Y is the value expected to be generated from the criminal
activity, and f is the cost of the criminal sanction. See id at 177 n 16.
32 This assumes, of course, that the utility functions of fiat currencies and cryptocurrencies are identical, so that the utility of $X is equal to the utility of $X worth of
cryptocurrencies. In reality, however, this assumption is probably overstated so long as
cryptocurrencies are not widely adopted.
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Governments’ most obvious response would be to impose a
stricter sanction in cases of illicit activity denominated in cryptocurrencies. Thus, if a criminal is sanctioned, he or she would
face a tougher sanction if the gains were denominated in cryptocurrencies than if the same gains were denominated in fiat currencies. This could theoretically equate the utility of using cryptocurrencies with the utility of using fiat currencies in criminal
activity. In such a case, the decision whether to engage in criminal behavior should not change on account of using cryptocurrencies versus fiat currencies, and the level of criminal activity
would be maintained.
There are several problems, however, with imposing increased sanctions on such cryptocurrency-denominated gains.
First, this approach means that two similarly situated criminals
may face different sanctions if one used fiat currencies and the
other used cryptocurrencies. There is a normative difficulty with
imposing different criminal sanctions on functionally identical
offenses simply because the gains are denominated in different
units of account. Second, a vast body of literature questions the
relationship between increased sanctions and the expected deterrence effect on criminal behavior. Many studies suggest that
increasing the probability of sanction has a larger deterrent effect than increasing the severity of a sanction.33
However, increased sanction is not the only course of action
that governments can take. The discussion thus far has assumed that the utility function of fiat currencies is identical to
that of cryptocurrencies. Governments are in a position to alter
this reality. For example, governments could design a quantity
regulation that limits the ability of certain institutions to deal in
cryptocurrencies.34 When major market participants do not
transact in cryptocurrencies, criminals are limited in their ability to use their illicit gains. In the alternative, governments
could create price regulations that impose certain costs on
dealings in cryptocurrencies in the open economy. For example,
it is possible to impose a sales tax on certain cryptocurrency
transactions when at least one of the parties to the transaction

33

See, for example, Becker, 76 J Pol Econ at 176 (cited in note 30).
China, for example, has banned certain financial institutions from handling
cryptocurrency transactions. See China Bans Financial Companies from Bitcoin Transactions, (Bloomberg News Dec 5, 2013), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201312-05/china-s-pboc-bans-financial-companies-from-bitcoin-transactions.html (visited Nov
19, 2014).
34
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is known to the government and can therefore be the target of
an enforcement action. This would force criminals to internalize
excess costs when disposing of their illicit gains in the open
economy.
Such regulatory impediments on the use of cryptocurrencies
would make the expected utility of $X worth of a cryptocurrency
lower than the utility of $X. Thus, some individuals who found it
cost-justified to engage in criminal behavior via cryptocurrencies
before the introduction of regulation would not do so after the
introduction of regulation, notwithstanding the fact that the
probability of sanction would be lower.
The obvious shortcoming of such regulatory impediments is
that they would also apply when cryptocurrencies are used for
legitimate purposes. If cryptocurrency transactions are subjected to regulatory costs and fiat-currency transactions are not, a
rational, law-abiding individual would never use cryptocurrencies. This might stifle innovation arising from cryptocurrencies.
It would also create an adverse-selection problem—under such
circumstances, wrongdoers are expected to be the primary
adopters of cryptocurrencies. This is not a desirable result.
In order to solve this problem, this Essay suggests that any
regulatory cost associated with the use of cryptocurrencies be
conditioned on anonymity. In essence, an individual transacting
in cryptocurrencies in the open economy would elect between
bearing the cost of regulation and waiving the trait that makes
cryptocurrencies suited for illicit behavior—anonymity. For example, merchants would be permitted to accept cryptocurrencies, provided that the other party to a transaction identified
herself as the owner of the cryptocurrency address used in that
transaction. This could be achieved by requiring purchasers to
sign transaction receipts or by using a private identification
number, as is done today in debit and credit card transactions. A
stronger version of the same idea would be to prohibit the use of
any cryptocurrency that had ever been transferred without adequate disclosure35 or that had ever been associated with an unknown public address.
In such a case, there is no increased cost for transacting in
cryptocurrencies compared with transacting in fiat currencies.
However, the probability of detection of any criminal activity associated with the cryptocurrency address used to transact is no
35

I am indebted to Professor Michael Abramowicz for this innovative idea.
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longer diminished because the owner of the address is known.
Thus, to the extent that it is preferable to use cryptocurrencies
for reasons that are not associated with anonymity, cryptocurrency use should flourish.
Finally, under such an approach, the status quo level of financial anonymity is maintained. The regulatory framework
should require that cryptocurrency users who elect to avoid the
regulatory cost provide information to the same extent as required when using other financial accounts. For example, instead of providing information to a credit card company, the user would be allowed to provide information directly to the
merchant, or to a third-party clearing organization that clears
cryptocurrency transactions for the merchant.
Such a regulatory framework has an important derivative
benefit. It not only addresses individuals’ incentive to use cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes, but it potentially makes the
cryptocurrency protocol as a whole less appealing for illicit users. Specifically, a unique feature of many cryptocurrencies’ protocols is that the anonymity of all users—legitimate and
illicit—is interconnected. As explained above, if the owners of
some addresses are known, the public ledger can be used to
identify owners of other addresses. The more addresses that are
identified, the easier it is to identify other addresses (if there is
a need to do so). Thus, a regulatory framework that incentivizes
legitimate users to give up their anonymity will produce a cascade effect: the more users that identify themselves, the less
anonymous the entire system becomes.
Theoretically, in order for the cascade effect to be meaningful, some critical mass of legitimate users would have to give up
their anonymity in order for the system to become nonanonymous enough to deter illicit activity. The difficulty here is that
the number of wallets that users can create is endless, and
therefore additional legitimate users would have to continuously
give up their anonymity. However, this could be mitigated if the
fact that users voluntarily give up their anonymity is made salient. If illicit users were confronted with a reality in which other
users give up their anonymity, then those illicit users would
never be able to tell whether a required critical mass of
identified users had been met. If this fact were salient enough,
illicit users should be sufficiently discouraged from using cryptocurrencies’ protocols. Under such a framework, legitimate users
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passively participate in regulatory efforts to prevent illicit
behavior.
III. AN EXAMPLE: AN ELECTIVE ANONYMITY TAX IN
CRYPTOCURRENCY TRANSACTIONS
Our tax-collection system is based on individual selfreporting. The enforcement of such reporting requirements is
largely dependent on the regulation of intermediaries. For example, various provisions in tax laws and regulations require financial institutions to identify their account holders. Based on
the identity of the account holders, these institutions may be required to withhold taxes on payments made to such account
holders and provide information about such account holders to
the IRS.36 The intermediaries are also required to provide the
account holder with information necessary to complete the account holder’s own tax return, generally on an IRS Form 1099.
However, many taxable transactions that are traditionally facilitated through financial institutions can theoretically rely on
cryptocurrency protocols in order to avoid the use of a costly financial intermediary and, as such, defeat intermediary-based
tax enforcement.37
For example, a consumer can use cryptocurrency the same
way that he or she uses cash. But, unlike cash, the disposition of
a bitcoin is a taxable transaction to the consumer.38 Under recent IRS guidance, cryptocurrency is “property” in the hands of a
taxpayer, which means that its disposition is a taxable event to
the extent that the cryptocurrency’s value has changed since its
acquisition by the taxpayer.39 Because no intermediaries are involved, the collection of such tax is possible only to the extent
that the taxpayer voluntarily reports such transactions.
However, a mechanism could be instituted to incentivize
consumers to identify themselves to a merchant or to an intermediary that provides cryptocurrency clearing services. Under
such a model, the merchant would function as a surrogate for
the collection of what is presumed to be the purchaser’s tax
liability in the transaction (similar to the collection of sales taxes). Such a model can be referred to as “surrogate

36
37
38
39

See Marian, 112 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 39 (cited in note 17).
See id.
See IRS, Notice 2014-21 *2 (cited in note 27).
Id.
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presumptive collection.”40 Merchants that accept cryptocurrencies as a form of payment would be required to collect a special
cryptocurrency-transaction tax based on a percentage of the
gross value of any cryptocurrency payment and remit such tax
to the IRS. This gross tax would be waived, however, if the consumer were identified by the merchant or by an approved thirdparty provider that cleared cryptocurrency payments for the
merchant. The consumer would effectively be in a position to
elect between avoiding the tax by disclosing his or her identity
and paying the gross tax to maintain his or her anonymity.
If the consumer refused to be identified, the gross tax would
serve as a proxy for what is functionally unreported income by
the consumer, and the consumer would be presumed to have
satisfied any tax liability associated with the transaction. In the
alternative, no tax would be imposed if the consumer identified
him or herself, under the assumption that, once the consumer’s
identity is exposed, he or she would have an incentive to properly report the income from the transaction.
The gross tax should be set at a rate that is more likely to
result in overcollection of taxes, so as to incentivize consumers
to identify themselves, or otherwise force them to internalize the
cost of their tax evasion. If the tax rate is set correctly, consumers who would not have engaged in tax evasion using traditional
payment methods should not be incentivized to do so using cryptocurrencies. To the extent that cryptocurrencies offer unique
benefits other than anonymity (such as avoiding the need to deal
with
exchange
rates),
consumers
should
opt
for
using cryptocurrencies.
IV. CRITIQUE
Notwithstanding the primordial nature of the discussion,
several critiques of the proposed framework should be noted.
The first possible critique is a normative one: Cryptocurrencies
offer an opportunity for increased financial anonymity, which
can be viewed as a normatively desirable goal. However, anonymity is also expected to increase the level of criminal
activity.41 The framework presented in this Essay thus
40 The term “presumptive collection” was coined by Professor Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas. See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect
Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 Tax L Rev 111
(2013).
41 See text accompanying notes 15–19.
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normatively rejects increased anonymity in favor of maintaining
extant levels of criminal activity (but allows other innovative
features of cryptocurrencies, such as decentralization). This
choice can be criticized on ideological grounds.
The framework can also be criticized on technical grounds.
If individuals can create as many cryptocurrency addresses as
they desire, then they may create different addresses for criminal and legitimate activities. Individuals who have opted to
commit crimes will use “known” wallets for their legal activity
and “hidden” wallets for their illegal activity. The response is
that the utility of any cryptocurrencies in hidden addresses will
be diminished, since hidden-wallet cryptocurrencies could be
used only to facilitate other criminal behavior but would be
barred from use in the open market. In order to avoid this limitation, hidden cryptocurrencies would have to be moved from
hidden to known addresses, at which point the owner of the hidden address could be traced using the public ledger.
Another possible critique of the above framework is that it
assumes a certain market structure in which multiple known
parties adopt bitcoin. An inherent limitation of the proposed
framework is that it is applicable only when cryptocurrencies
are used to transact with such known parties. Theoretically,
then, if very few known merchants adopt cryptocurrencies, the
functionality of the regulatory framework would be limited. This
observation should not prove particularly damaging, however,
for three reasons. First, merchants are increasingly adopting
cryptocurrencies. For example, over the past two years, Dell,
Dish Network, Expedia, Overstock, and other major retailers
have all started to accept bitcoin as a form of payment.42 These
retailers can be a focal point of regulatory effort. Bitcoin has also
been largely integrated into existing payment mechanisms such
as PayPal.43 Such intermediaries can also be used as regulatory
agents. Second, to the extent that cryptocurrencies do remain
isolated from open markets, cryptocurrencies are unlikely to
present a significant regulatory problem, as their economic scale
would remain rather small. If the cryptocurrency economy is to
42 See Sydney Ember, Dell Begins Accepting Bitcoin, DealBook (NY Times July 18,
2014), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/dell-begins-accepting-bitcoin
(visited Nov 16, 2014).
43 See Ryan Mac, PayPal Takes Baby Step toward Bitcoin, Partners with Cryptocurrency
Processors,
(Forbes
Sept
23,
2014),
online
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/23/paypal-takes-small-step-toward-bitcoinpartners-with-cryptocurrency-processors (visited Nov 17, 2014).
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succeed, it must be used to interact with physical commodities
and real services—namely, with real people who can be identified by regulators. In other words, if cryptocurrencies are not
significantly adopted in the open market, then their utility is
diminished compared with fiat currencies and the regulatory
challenge remains minimal. Third, as noted above, to the extent
that cryptocurrencies do become significant economic instruments, intermediaries will emerge. “In reality, most people will
rely on intermediaries . . . when they use [cryptocurrencies].”44
Most users (both merchants and consumers) are not tech experts
and will naturally turn to intermediaries to dispose of their
cryptocurrencies. Such intermediaries can be used, for example,
to enforce the proposed tax.
Finally, the proposed framework could theoretically collapse
if cryptocurrencies’ protocols become completely anonymous.
Several projects are aimed at taking the “public” out of the “public ledger,” making all decentralized transfers completely anonymous by masking the addresses used in the transfers.45 If such
projects are successful, it would be impossible to build a transaction graph in order to trace transfers, and the entire regulatory
approach would collapse. This Essay dismisses the idea that a
completely anonymous financial system (that is, a system in
which parties to a transaction are not known to each other) can
succeed at all. It is devoid of an essential component of successful financial markets: trust. Completely anonymous cryptocurrencies may successfully function as a unit of account among
criminals, but not in the context of transactions that require
trust among parties. It is doubtful that such cryptocurrencies
can induce noncriminals to become criminals, as the utility of
these currencies would be significantly diminished.
CONCLUSION
This Essay decoupled cryptocurrencies into their two unique
components: anonymity and decentralization. It then proposed a
regulatory framework that targets the former and protects the
latter, by adopting regulatory instruments that impose costs only on anonymity. Such a framework impedes the use of crypto-

44

Yee, 3 Internet Pol Rev at 5 (cited in note 2).
One such project is Darkcoin. See Darkcoin, What is Darkcoin?, (2014), online at
https://www.darkcoin.io/about/what-is-darkcoin (visited Nov 11, 2014).
45
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currencies in illicit activity but allows for legitimate uses of
cryptocurrencies.
A full inquiry into the regulation of cryptocurrencies is
beyond the scope of this Essay. Many important issues—such as
regulatory-design choices, behavioral incentives, and the
analysis of costs and benefits—remain for future research. However, the proposed framework offers a rallying point for future
discussion on the design of regulatory instruments seeking to
control the use of cryptocurrencies. The suggested framework
also offers two new insights: First, it is conceivable to design
regulatory instruments that target only the negative traits of
cryptocurrencies while allowing positive traits to flourish. Second, it is possible to leverage the unique nature of the public
ledger to enlist legitimate users as passive participants in
regulatory efforts.
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